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And the personal insights provided by MacArthur's commanders and staff members are revealing.That said, Weintraub is at his worse when he touches on the U.S. The 65th fought brilliantly for the first two years of the war and then failed at two battles in the fall of 1952 for many of the same reasons the 24th Infantry failed earlier in the war.Thus, as in another of his more recent works in which he touches on the conflict ("15 Stars. To his credit he lets the veterans, who participated in the conflict, narrate much of the action.
A published history of the 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea ("Black Soldier, White Army"), which Weintraub cites but appears not to have read, shows that the failures of the unit in the Korean War were the result of racist policies, weak leadership by its white officers, poor training, and a lack of equipment. Eisenhower, MacArthur, Marshall. And a new forthcoming history of the 65th Infantry Regiment in Korea will show that the unit arrived in country as the largest and one of the best trained infantry formations in Eighth Army.
Although a relatively good history of the early years of the Korean War and the resurrection and failure of General Douglas MacArthur in that conflict, "MacArthur's War" suffers from glaring inaccuracies.Historian and Korean War veteran Stanley Weintraub is at his best when describing the war in Korea. His description of both units in Korea is unbalanced and historically inaccurate. Three Generals Who Saved the American Century), Stanley Weintraub perpetuates inaccurate and hurtful racial stereotypes of African Americans and Hispanic fighting men in the Korean War.
The author also makes use of new archival sources, especially when describing the origins of Operation Chromite - the amphibious landings at Inchon. Army's ethnic formations - especially the African-American 24th Infantry Regiment and the all-Puerto Rican 65th Infantry Regiment.
general himself. Every doubt is resolved against him. More is known now about the Korean Conflict from the (Communist) Chinese side--if not the North Korean. How ironic that Gen. Example: the poor battlefield performance of an all-Black regiment in a segregated Army. MacArthur was assigned responsibility for the deplorable state to which the U.S. The son of a Union Army general, MacArthur was anything but a G.I.
Even things for which the general was not responsible are invariably blamed on him in this book. MacArthur's replacement, Gen Ridgeway, took an interest in all these things--fortunately for Eighth Army and the Western World.However, Weintraub goes too far in faulting MacArthur.
side, would fall in disgrace thirteen years on during Mao's Cultural Revolution.Certainly it is high time that Gen. He had no interest in the minutiae of war: whether the troops had clothing for winter, when they last had a hot meal, whether their radios worked.
Some of this information is incorporated here though it tends to be vague and general. He was--or saw himself--a grand strategist.
Actions he took, things he said, which deserved no criticism--which even were praiseworthy--are twisted and distorted so as to look negative.There also are stylistic flaws--lack of concentration, jarring **non sequiturs** encountered again and again, reliance on few and clearly biased sources. Peng De-Huai, very successful against the U.N.
Army in the Pacific had sunk in the six years following the Japanese surrender.
And yes, I am not a MacArthur fan. Virtually all MacArthur's contemporaries above the grade of corporal saw an amphibious assault on Inchon as a dangerous operation the execution of which foreclosed a very real opportunity decisively (by landing further south on less dangerous beaches) to trap the North Koreans between Almond's 10th Corp and Walton Walker's Eighth Army, end the conflict in compliance with the UN mandate, pack up and go home. The folly out was that 10th Corp has no mission after the unnecessary recapture of Seoul and once it crossed the peninsula, what next. Thanks to the US Marines, MacArthur got away with it, but one can only observe that even if one or two men in history have survived jumping out of airplanes without parachutes, such is not a wise act.
Of the many MacArthur myths, none seems more pervasive than the myth that Inchon was a stellar military achievement. His incompetence destroyed the 31st Infantry Regiment (with which I served in Korea as a rifleman) twice in a decade (Bataan and the Reservoir in Korea). History records the answer. In point of fact, Inchon was folly in and folly out.
MacArthur's maniacal ego had as end in view his parading pompously into the Korean government house to "restore" Korea to Syngman Rhee. Beyond 1918 MacArthur stayed too long at the ball and many good men paid for it. Folly in. Not only was Inchon an invasion that required far more luck than MacArthur deserved, merely to get the landing force up Flying Fish channel, over a high sea wall and landed in the face of potentially devastating flanking fire from Wolmi-do Island, but also it violated a stern article of amphibious warfare wisdom that argued against sending a landing force immediately to fight in a built-up area.
This book makes the flow of battle see more comprehensible than other books which I have read and places terms, such as "Frozen Chosen" into context. His practice of accepting credit for their successes while washing his hands of their failures was the culmination of a life long practice which infuriated his subordinates throughout his military career.This book is not all MacArthur, it is also about war. Although I had read a little of the Korean War, Stanley Weintraub presents events in a different light than I have seen in other works. I feel that I understand the Korean War and Douglas MacArthur better than I did before reading this book. Weintraub is generally favorable to MacArthur, contrasting his decisive action with, what he portrays, as uncertainty and indecision among his superiors in Washington. "MacArthur's War" provides the reader with an up close view of the initial portions of the Korean War with particular emphasis on the role of Gen.
Much of it focuses on the role of the on the ground American soldiers and their commanders, all of whom served and suffered under MacArthur.I found the many facets of this book to be interesting. The readier is introduced to the experiences of the ordinary soldier and their officers at all levels. Douglas MacArthur. Weintraub suggests that some of MacArthur's insubordinate actions were not necessarily manifestations of uninformed or undisciplined arrogance, but may have been a reasoned strategy to maneuver his superiors into the position that he would have to be relieved.Looking in the other direction, Weintraub introduces his readers to the resentment which MacArthur's actions generated in his subordiantes. "MacArthur's War" is an unrivaled asset for anyone with an interest in either. It is not, however, a one-dimensional view.
He depicts MacArthur's indecisiveness at the start of the war in contrast to his later decisiveness in the absence of in in opposition to authorization.
Which under his command was able to recapture some of the lands lost to the Communist. But his total lack of failure to anticipate Chinese entry into the war and his delusion that Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese forces in Formosa could be brought into the war to fight the Communists as a viable force had him lose all credability.Only by General Matthew Ridgway taking command of the Allied ground forces were the Allies able to reverse the trend. But Korea is not an area where his career shines. During this time MacArthur actual came up with a plan to sow a defensive field of radioactive waste on the southern bank of the Yalu. forces and drove back the North Korean army to the Yalu river, which is the border between Korea and China. There is no question that Douglas MacArthur had a long and distinguished career.
And did much to help Japan reform and rebuild. General Ridgway took the demoralized Allied troops and transformed them back into a strong fighting force. And that he showed great Barvery in World War I. And at center stage was his very risky yet stunning achievement, his amphibious attack behind enemy lines at Inchon. This plan helped Truman to make the to make the decission to dismiss MacArthur at the begining of April 1951.This work is well written and well worth reading. That he planned some great island hopping strategy during World War II.
When conflict broke out in Korea in 1950, MacArthur assumed command of American, South Korean and U.N.
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